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Abstract. In this paper, we propose an HB-like protocol for privacy-preserving
authentication of RFID tags, whereby a tag can remain anonymous and untrace-
able to an adversary during the authentication process. Previous proposals of such
protocols were based on PRF computations. Our protocol can instead be used on
low-cost tags that may be incapable of computing standard PRFs. Moreover, since
the underlying computations in HB protocols are very efficient, our protocol also
reduces reader load compared to PRF-based protocols.
We suggest a tree-based approach that replaces the PRF-based authentication
from prior work with a procedure such as HB+ or HB#. We optimize the tree-
traversal stage through usage of a “light version” of the underlying protocol and
shared random challenges across all levels of the tree. This provides significant re-
duction of the communication resources, resulting in a privacy-preserving protocol
almost as efficient as the underlying HB+ or HB#.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is increasingly used in many aspects
of daily life. Low-cost RFID devices have numerous applications in military, commercial
and medical domains. In most of these applications, an RFID reader must authenticate
its designated tags to prevent tag forgery and counterfeiting. At the same time, privacy
concerns in many of these applications dictate that the tag’s identity is not revealed to
an attacker, even while the tag authenticates itself (and even if the attacker pretends to
be a reader).
RFID tags are typically very low-cost devices and their computation and storage
capabilities are severely constrained. Hence, traditional authentication protocols based
on Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) may not be applicable on such tags. To this end,
Juels and Weis [9] suggested using the HB protocol (of Hopper and Blum [8]) for tag
authentication. Several enhancements such as HB+ [9] and HB# [6] were proposed later,
and are currently the only viable solutions for very low-cost authentication.
Further complicating RFID authentication is the fact that a single reader must often
handle a very large tag population, possibly in the millions or even billions. Clearly,
to use the appropriate secret keys, the reader must learn the identity of a tag that is
trying to authenticate itself. Although the tag can identify itself by sending a pre-shared
unique identifier, such identifiers can easily be used by an eavesdropping adversary to
compromise the privacy and anonymity of the tags (and thus also of their bearers).
Therefore, a privacy-preserving solution is needed to allow the reader to identify the tag.
One possible approach to achieve privacy-preserving authentication is for the reader to
perform an exhaustive search, by trying to match the result of the tag being authenticated
against all possible tags. However, this requires a large O(N) amount of computation for
a population of N tags. To address this scalability problem, Molnar et al. [14] proposed
using a “tree of keys”, assigning to each tag the keys corresponding to a root-to-leaf
path in the tree, and using these keys as seeds for a PRF; the PRF-based response
of a tag is then linked to this path, and this link is used to identify the tag. This
solution reduces the reader computational complexity of O(log(N)). Also, Cheon et al.
[4] proposed a 2D-mesh scheme that enables the reader to identify the tag with complexity
of O(
√
N logN): The idea is to create two sets of PRF keys, each with
√
N keys, and
give every tag one key from each of the two sets, such that the combination of these two
keys uniquely determined that tag. In [2], Burmester et al. also utilized PRF functions
for an anonymous RFID authentication scheme with constant lookup. In this approach,
the reader keeps for every tag a constant number of pseudonyms. At the end of each
successful authentication session the tag generates a new pseudonym, which the reader
then uses to identify the tag from its tag lookup pseudonyms table.
All the above proposals are based on protocols that require the tag to compute
PRF operations and therefore not applicable to very low-cost tags. To this end, we
consider the HB family of protocols for privacy-preserving authentication. Adapting HB-
like protocols to this setting takes some care, however. For example, HB protocols are
typically designed with very tight parameters, which yield a non-negligible false accept
rate (FAR), i.e., the probability of an illegitimate tag successfully authenticating to the
reader. In an exhaustive search, the overall false accept rate grows roughly by a factor
of N . For example, an instance of the HB+ protocol with 80 rounds and noise probability
of 0.25, has an FAR of 4×10−6. When using this instance, with an exhaustive search over
a population of a million tags, the overall FAR would be close to one, which is clearly
unacceptable for any practical use.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work we develop a tree-based protocol for privacy-preserving authentication.
Specifically, we study the use of HB-like protocols (such as HB+ or HB#). Our tree-
based protocol has two logical stages. First there is a tree traversal stage, in which
the reader tries to identify the most likely tag to authenticate, and then there is an
authentication stage, in which the identity of that “most likely tag” is verified. Unlike
exhaustive search, the false-accept rate of this protocol does not grow with the number
of tags in the population, since only one tag is authenticated in the last stage. We also
show that the false-reject rate grows very slowly, despite the presence of a large number
of tags. We propose several optimizations over naive use of HB+/HB# in a tree-based
scheme. These optimizations bring the communication of the tree-based protocol down
to not much more than the underlying HB+/HB# authentication protocol, and also
improve the computation time.
Our work is based on the observation that the function fx(A) = Ax + noise for
a random matrix A behaves like a (randomized) pseudo-random function (which was
proven in [1, Lemma 3.2] under the assumption that learning parity with noise is hard).
Therefore we replace the standard PRFs during the tree-traversal stage with this “HB-
like” function. We observe that this function only needs tag-generated random challenges
during the tree-traversal stage. (It is only in the authentication stage that a reader-
generated challenge is needed.) Moreover, there is no need to generate a new challenge
in every level, it is perfectly safe to use the same random challenge in all the levels of the
tree, and we can use significantly smaller parameters during the tree-traversal stage. The
combination of these observations reduces computation and communication by a factor
of 2× to 4× (In fact our tree protocol is almost as efficient as the underlying HB+ or
HB#). We present analytical and simulation results comparing our method with prior
proposals in terms of computation, communication and memory overheads.
We note that just like all other HB-type protocols, ours is also vulnerable to man-in-
the-middle attacks [7, 16]. Also, just like other tree-based protocols, its privacy guarantees
degrade somewhat when the secret keys of many tags are exposed to the adversary.
2 Background: HB-type Protocols
In the original HB protocol by Hopper and Blum [8], the reader and the tag share a
secret x which is a k-bit vector (e.g. k = 256, 512, etc.). The protocol consists of many
rounds. In each round the reader sends a random challenge vector a and the tag replies
with one bit z = a ·x⊕ ν, where ν is 1 with probability ε (for some parameter ε < 0.5).
After r such rounds, the tag is accepted if z matches z′ = a · x at least r − τ times,
where τ is some threshold parameter.
The HB protocol is vulnerable to attacks by an active adversary, who can send to
the tag the same challenge a many times, thereby eliminating the noise and recovering
the secret x. To counter this attack, the HB+ protocol by Juels and Weis [9] added a
second secret y that is shared by the reader and the tag. In each round of the protocol,
a random challenge b is generated by the tag, a second challenge a is generated by the
reader, and the tag sends to the reader z = a ·x⊕b ·y⊕ν. As before, the tag is accepted
after r rounds if z matches z′ = a · x⊕ b · y at least r − τ times.
It was later shown in [10, 11] that all the rounds can be carried out in parallel: The
tag chooses a matrix B, the reader responds with a matrix A, the tag chooses a noise
vector ν and replies z = A ·x⊕B ·y⊕ ν, and the reader checked that z is close enough
to z′ = A ·x⊕B · y. This protocol can withstand an active attacker that interacts with
the tags, but it is still vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks [7, 16].
The HB# protocol [6] is a variant where the “types” of the secrets and the challenges
are swapped: Namely, the tag and reader share secrets X and Y which are r×k matrices,
the challenges are r-vectors a and b, and the reply that the tag computes is z = a ·X ⊕
b · Y ⊕ ν. To alleviate the additional storage requirement, HB# proposes using Toeplitz
matrices for X,Y . Another claimed benefit for swapping the types is that HB# can resist
some limited form of man-in-the-middle attacks, however, not all [16].
2.1 Security
The security of the HB series of protocols relies on the computational hardness of the
problem of Learning from Parity with Noise (LPN) [9]. Roughly, the LPN problem is to
find a secret k-vector x given a random binary r×k matrix A and a vector z = A ·x⊕ν,
where ν is a noise vector in which each entry is set to 1 with probability ε (for a parameter
0 < ε < 1
2
).
The hardness of this problem (and thus the security level of the protocols) depends
on the choice of the parameters ε and k. The best algorithm for learning parity with
noise is due to Blum, Kalai and Wasserman [3], with some later optimizations, notably
Reader (x,y) Tag (x,y)
a ∈ n{0, 1}k b ∈ n{0, 1}kb - challenge
✛
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z = a · x ⊕ b · y ⊕ ν
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✛
z′ = a · x ⊕ b · y
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Fig. 1. One round of the HB+ Protocol
by Levieil and Fouque [12]. Based on the performance of the BKW algorithm, Juels and
Weis suggested in [9] that setting k = 224 and ε ∈ [ 1
8
, 1
4
] yields an 80-bit security level.
In [12], Levieil and Fouque claimed, however, that these parameters yield only a 55-bit
security level, and that with ε = 1
4
one needs to use k = 512. (They also noted that only
one of the secrets x,y in HB+ needs to be this long, while the other can safely be only
80-bit long.)
The other parameters of interest in HB-type protocols are the number of rounds3
and the acceptance threshold. Juels and Weis suggested in [9] to use number of rounds
r ∈ [40, 80] and set the threshold at τ = εr. This gives a relatively high false reject rate
(FRR) of 0.44, and when used with error probability ε ∈ [ 1
8
, 1
4
] it gives false-accept rates
(FAR) between 10−3 and 10−9. (The HB# proposal in [6] suggested other parameters
with a much lower FRR and FAR, e.g., FAR ≤ 2−80 and FRR ≈ 2−45.)
3 Private Authentication with an HB-like protocol
Recall that in our setting, we have a system with many tags under one administrative
domain. Similarly to [14], we arrange all the tags in a tree structure and use this structure
to find the right tag to authenticate. However, we use an HB-like procedure to implement
both the tree search and the tag authentication as opposed to the PRF-based solution
in [14].
A naive approach would simply perform the underlying authentication protocol at
every level of the tree. Namely, at every level one can run HB+ (or HB#) and the reader
then performs an exhaustive search over the children of the current node, selecting the
one for which the authentication was successful.4 A closer inspection reveals that this
naive approach can be significantly improved:
– First, there is no reason to use challenges from the reader while traversing the tree.
Indeed, the challenge from the reader is needed for secure authentication, but not
for the identification of “the right tag to authenticate”.
3 The name “number of rounds” refers to a sequential protocol where a one-bit z is returned
in every round. For the parallel version, this parameter is the reply-size.
4 In the rest of this paper, we concentrate only on the case of HB+. The treatment of HB# is
completely analogous.
We therefore suggest to logically split the protocol into a tree-traversal stage, where
the reader finds the right tag to authenticate, and an authentication stage, where the
identity of that tag is verified. In the authentication stage, we just use the under-
lying HB+ protocol unchanged, but in the tree-traversal stage we only use random
challenges from the tag. This optimization cuts the computation time and storage
requirements for both the tag and the reader.
(We note, however, that in the asymmetric setting suggested in [12], where one secret
is longer than the other, we need to store a long secret in every internal node in the
tree. For example, using the 512/80 asymmetric setting, this optimization only saves
80 of the combined 512 + 80 = 592 bits, which is ≈ 13%.)
– More importantly, we observe that we can share the same challenges across all the
levels. Namely, instead of the tag sending a different challenge for every level, we
send only one challenge and use it at all the levels. This means that we only have
communication of two challenges throughout the tree-based protocol (just as in the
underlying HB+), and the only additional communication is an r-bit response vector
for every level.
In more details, the reader in our system maintains a tree structure with the tags
at the leaves, and each internal node n in the tree is associated with a secret key yn,
which is a binary vector of length ky. A tag t, associated with a leaf in the tree, is given
all the secret keys that are associated with nodes on the path from the root to that
leaf. In addition the tag is also given two unique secret keys xt and yt (of length kx
and ky, respectively) that are used for authentication. The notations that we use in the
description below are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Notation table
d depth of the tree
β branching factor of the tree
kx, ky length of the secrets in the system (kx = 80, ky ∈ [224, 512])
r size of the “response” messages (usually r ∈ [80, 128])
ε noise level (ε = 0.25)
τ acceptance threshold (usually τ ∈ [20, 40])
3.1 System Setup
The system is setup with some upper bound N on the number of tags that it can support,
and the parameters r, d, β are derived from this upper bound. (See Section 5.6 for a
discussion of how to determine these parameters.) Once determined, the parameters d, β
define a tree with βd ≥ N leaves, which will be associated with the tags in the system.
Also, a “master secret” is chosen, which will be used to determine all the other secrets
in the system as described next.
3.2 Tag Registration
When a tag is registered into the system, it is associated with a random available leaf in
the tree. This can be done either by the system administrator remembering the positions
of all the tags in the tree and choosing at random one leaf that is not yet used, or by
choosing a random permutation π over the domain [1, βd] and assigning the i’th tag in
the system to leaf π(i). 5
Let n0, n1, . . . , nd be the path in the tree from the root (denoted n0) to the leaf that
is associated with the new tag (denoted nd). For each node ni (except the root), the
tag is given the ky-bit secret yni that is associated with that node. (This secret can be
derived from the master secret, say by setting yni = PRFms(ni) for some pseudo-random
function PRF that is keyed by the master secret ms.) The tag also gets two additional
keys xt and yt of size k (that can similarly be derived from the master secret). After
registration, the tag will hold the keys yn1 , . . . ,ynd ,xt,yt.
3.3 Tree-Traversal Stage
At the start of the authentication process, the tag needs to be identified so the correct
keys can be used for the authentication. To this end, the tag chooses a r × ky random
challenge matrix B, and noise vectors νi for every level i in the tree. The tag computes
zi = B · yni ⊕ νi and sends to the reader the matrix B and all the zi’s.
Starting from the root, the reader then goes down node by node, using the zi’s to
decide what child of the current node it needs to use next. Specifically, for every child c
of the root it computes zc = B · yc , where yc is the secret associated with that child.
Then, the reader descends into the child c for which zc is closest to the response vector
z1 received from the tag. Similarly, after descending into an internal node ni at level i,
the reader computes zc = B · yc for every child c of ni, and descends into the child c
for which zc is closest to zi that was received from the tag. (Throughout this process, if
two children are equally close to zi, one is chosen arbitrarily as the next node).
After using all the zi’s, the reader arrives at one of the leaves of the tree, and then it
uses the secrets x,y that are associated with the tag at that leaf in the authentication
stage, as described next.
3.4 Authentication Stage
At the end of the Tree-traversal stage, the reader arrives at a leaf that it considers to
be the most likely to be the one associated with the correct tag. At this stage, we need
to run the authentication protocol to confirm that the tag is valid. Here we just use the
parallel HB+ protocol. Specifically, the reader sends a random challenge matrix A, the
tag chooses a noise vector ν, and reply with z = A · xt ⊕B · yt ⊕ ν (using the two last
secret keys xt,yt that it holds). The reader recovers the keys x,y that are associated
with the tag in this most likely leaf, computes z′ = A · x ⊕ B · y, and checks that the
Hamming distance between z and z′ is below the threshold τ . It accepts the tag if z
and z′ are close enough, and rejects it otherwise.
4 Security Analysis
Recall that we have two security goals in our model, namely privacy and authentication.
Our attack model allows the adversary to eavesdrop on the communication between
5 An efficient method for implementing such a random permutation was recently proposed by
Morris et al. [15].
tags and the reader, and also to communicate directly with the tag and the reader, but
NOT to modify messages that are sent between them. In other words, we consider an
active adversary, but explicitly disregard man-in-the-middle attacks (since all HB-type
protocols are insecure against them [7, 16]).
4.1 Authentication
Our model for authentication is essentially the usual det model [9, 10, 6], where in our
case we have one target tag that the attacker is trying to impersonate, and all the other
tags in the system are considered to be adversarial. In more details, the attacker first gets
the secrets of all the tags in the system but one, then it can interact with the remaining
tag for q times, and finally it interacts with the reader and tries to impersonate that
remaining tag.
Since we just run the original HB+ protocol at the authentication stage, then trivially
our protocol is as resilient against impersonation as HB+. (Formally, there is a trivial
tight reduction from breaking our protocol to breaking the original HB+.)
4.2 Privacy
Our privacy model meant to capture an attacker who can interact with many tags, and
who tries to link different authentication sessions. For example, consider an attacker
that roams through a library talking to tags and recording the books that these tags are
embedded in. Later the attacker detects some tags in the book-bag of a random person
on the street, and it tries to recognize these tags (thereby recognizing the books that
this person checked out).
A (somewhat simplistic) formalization of this concern has the adversary talking to
two tags in the system, which are chosen as follows: First the adversary chooses two
arbitrary distinct tags in the system, and then a fair coin is tossed. If it comes out head
then the two tags are the ones chosen by the adversary, and if it comes out tail then
the two tags that the adversary talks to are actually just the first tag that it chose. The
adversary now interacts with the “two tags” for a total of q sessions, at the end of which
is needs to guess the outcome of the coin toss.
We note that this is not the only possible definition for privacy in this setting (and
maybe also not the most natural one). For example, this definition does not consider the
possibility of the adversary compromising some tags and learning their secrets. Still, we
think that this model is a reasonably meaningful one.
The security of our protocol in this model follows easily from the fact that the function
fy(B) = B · y + noise is a pseudorandom function when B is random, and this fact was
proven in [1, Lemma 3.2] to follows from the hardness of LPN. Indeed, it is easy to see
that if we replace this function in our protocol with a truly random function then the
adversary would have zero advantage in guessing the outcome of the coin-toss in the
experiment from above. (The fact that we can share the same challenge matrix B for all
levels of the tree follow from an easy hybrid argument.)
We finally note that our protocol, like all tree-based protocols, is somewhat vulnerable
to tag-compromise. If an attacker manages to get the secrets of a specific tag, it can
use them to recognize the tree-traversal replies of neighbor tags in the tree (and in
particular it can distinguish neighbors of the compromised tags from non-neighbors).
Devising mechanisms to mitigate the effect of tag compromise is an interesting open
problem.
5 Parameters and Performance
Below we analyze the false reject and false accept rates for a fixed set of parameters
β, d, r, and then use this analysis to set these parameters (as a function of the total
number of tags N).
5.1 False-Accept Rate
We begin by observing that the false-accept rate of our protocol is exactly the same as
that of the underlying HB+ that is used in the authentication stage. To see why, observe
that the tree-traversal stage of the protocol always results in the reader identifying one
leaf of the tree as the most likely to correspond to the right tag, and then the underlying
HB+ is run against the keys of the tag in this most likely leaf.
This is in sharp contrast to the situation for the trivial linear search routine that
was discussed in the introduction. In that procedure, the reader would try to check the
authentication against the keys of all the tags in the system, so the false-accept rate would
roughly be multiplied by the number of tags. This does not happen in our algorithm,
since the reader only tries to authenticate against the keys of just one tag.
In other words, even giving the adversary “for free” the ability to steer the tree-
traversal stage to any tag of its choice, it would still have to be able to authenticate a
tag without knowing its keys in order to induce a false accept event.
5.2 False-Reject Rate
We note, however, that the false reject rate of our algorithm will be higher than the
standard HB+. This is because the tree-traversal stage may identify wrong leaf, in which
case the authentication stage will almost surely reject. We therefore need to analyze the
probability that the tree-traversal stage identifies the wrong leaf.
Taking a false branch, the binary case. We start by considering a binary tree (i.e.,
β = 2) and analyzing the probability that the wrong branch is chosen at one step of
the tree-traversal stage. For the binary tree, if the algorithm is currently in a node at
level ℓ−1 which is on the path to the true tag, then the likelihood of choosing the wrong
child for level ℓ is exactly the probability that the non-matching key of that “false child”
generates a vector zf that is closer to the response vector zℓ than the matching key of
the “true child”.
Below we denote by Hwt the Hamming weight of a binary vector. We denote the “true
child” of the current node by t (i.e., the child on the path to the true tag that is trying
to authenticate itself), and denote the other child of that node by f (for a “false child”).
With the keys of these children denoted yt and yf , respectively, and the tag sending a
challenge matrix B, recall that the reader computes zf = B · yf and zt = B · yt, and
compares these two vectors against the vector zℓ that was sent by the tag.
The probability of descending into the wrong child f is bounded by the probability
that zf is closer to zℓ than zt, namely Pr[Hwt(zf ⊕ zℓ) < Hwt(zt ⊕ zℓ)]. We denote by
Pt(i) the probability that zt, zℓ differ by exactly i positions, and similarly by Pf (i) we
denote the probability that zf , zℓ differ by exactly i positions. Namely,
Pt(i)
def
= Pr[Hwt(zt ⊕ zℓ) = i] =
(
r
i
)
εi(1− ε)r−i (where we use ε = 1/4)
Pf (i)
def
= Pr[Hwt(zf ⊕ zℓ) = i] =
(
r
i
)
/2r
Then we bound the probability of taking a false branch by
Pr [Hwt(zf ⊕ zℓ) < Hwt(zt ⊕ zℓ)] =
r∑
i=1
Pt(i) ·

i−1∑
j=0
Pf (j)

 (1)
We can approximate the above expression as follows: Let ∆ft be the difference be-
tween the Hamming weight of zt ⊕ zℓ and zf ⊕ zℓ,
∆ft
def
= Hwt(zf ⊕ zℓ)− Hwt(zt ⊕ zℓ)
The random variable∆ft is the sum of r independent and identically distribution random
variables, one for every position in the response vector (and each a random variable over
{−1, 0, 1}). The probability of taking a false branch is then bounded by Pr[∆ft < 0],
and by the law of large numbers we can approximate ∆ft by a Normal random variable
with the same mean and variance. Recalling that Hwt(zt ⊕ zℓ) has mean µt = r4 and
variance σ2t =
3r
16
and that Hwt(zf ⊕ zℓ) has mean µf = r2 and variance σ2f = r4 , we get
that ∆ft has mean µ = µf − µt = r4 and variance σ2 = σ2t + σ2f = 7r16 . Hence we have
Pr[false branch] ≤ Pr[∆ft < 0] ≈ erfc
(
r/4√
7r/8
)
)
= erfc
(√
r/14
)
For example, if we choose r = 80, then we estimate the probability of choosing a false
branch as Pr[false branch] ≈ 6.97·10−4, while a choice of r = 144 gives Pr[false branch] ≈
5.38 · 10−6.
Taking a false branch, the general case. For a larger branching factor (β > 2), we
can still use an equation similar to Equation (1) for the probability of choosing a false
branch, but estimating it becomes harder. Specifically, we replace the probability that
one false tag has less errors than the true tag by the probability that at least one of the
false tags has less errors:
Pr[false branch](β) =
r∑
i=1
Pt(i) ·

1−

1− i−1∑
j=0
Pf (j)


β

 (2)
However, estimating the last expression is harder, since we need to bound the probability
that the minimum of several random variables is below zero (and moreover these random
variables are highly correlated).
In lieu of an analytical bound, we therefore evaluated the expression from Equa-
tion (2) explicitly, and plotted the results in Figure 2. Specifically, fixing the target
false-branch probability to some constant (either 0.1 or 0.01), we plot for every branch-
ing factor from β = 2 to β = 104 the smallest response-size r for which the false-branch
probability is below that target. (For example, with branching factor of β = 1000 we need
r ≈ 80 to get false-branch probability of 0.1.) As expected, for a constant probability of
false branch, the response-size r grows linearly with the log of the branching factor.
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Fig. 2. Branching factor (β) vs. response-length (r), for false-branch probabilities of 0.1 and
0.01.
The overall false reject rate. Recall that a valid tag can be falsely rejected either
due to the algorithm choosing a false branch at some point during the tree-traversal
stages, or due to a false reject in the authentication stage. The probability of failing the
authentication stage is equal to the probability that the error vector has more than τ
ones, namely the false-reject rate of the authentication stage is
FRR(auth)
def
=
r∑
i=t+1
εi(1− ε)r−i
(
r
i
)
(3)
and the combined false-reject rate of the whole protocol is
FRR(Tree-HB+) ≈ d · Pr[false branch] + FRR(auth) (4)
As mentioned in [10], the false reject rate can be reduced if the tag checks the noise
vector ν and only use it if it has at most τ one-bits.
5.3 Computation, Storage and Communication
The computation of the reader during the tree-traversal stage consists of d levels, wherein
each level the reader computes β vectors zc (one for every child c of the current node)
and compares them to the response-vector zi that the tag sent. Then, the computation
during the authentication stage consists of a single execution of parallel-HB+. Recalling
that every vector zc during the tree-traversal stage takes one matrix-vector product to
compute and the authentication stage takes two more matrix-vector products (one of
which with a smaller kx × r matrix), we get that the total computation on the reader
side is between dβ + 1 and dβ + 2 matrix-vector multiplications.
On the tag side, the tag computes one matrix-vector product for every level of the
tree in the tree-traversal stage, and two more in the authentication stage (again, one of
which with a smaller matrix), for a total of between d+ 1 and d+ 2 products.
As for communication, the tag sends the challenge matrix B for parallel-HB+ and the
response vectors zi, it receives the challenge matrix A and then sends z. Hence the total
communication (in both directions) is r(kx + ky + d).
6 Finally, the storage requirement
on the tag is ky(d+ 1) + kx bits.
An important optimization for our protocol is to choose different values for the
response-length r in the two stages, so as to get d ·Pr[false-branch] ≈ FRR(auth). If we
denote by rtr the response-length in the tree-traversal stage and by r the response-length
in the authentication stage, we get total communication of r(kx + ky) + rtrd. The effect
on computation is even larger: since we typically have rtr < r/2, the total computation
is decreased by about a factor of two.
5.4 Iterating the Protocol
We recall that an easy (and cheap) way of reducing the false-reject rate is to iterate the
protocol several times. Specifically, given a protocol Π with FRR of γ, FAR of δ, and
complexity C, we can get from it a protocol Π ′ with smaller FRR as follows: we first
run Π once, and if the authentication fails then we run it again. Clearly, Π ′ has FRR
of γ2 and FAR of 2δ, and we note that its expected complexity is only C(1 + γ) (since
with probability 1− γ we will only run it once).
Similarly, by repeating the original protocol Π upto s times, we obtain a protocol
Πs with FRR of γs, FAR of sδ, and for large s the expected complexity will approach
C/(1 − γ). This means that even protocols with very large false-reject rate (such as
the original HB+ that has FRR≈ 0.44) are meaningful, in that we can transform them
cheaply to protocols with adequately low FRR.
5.5 Protocol Comparison
In Table 2 we compare the trivial exhaustive search with HB+ (ES), our tree-based
privacy-preserving HB+ protocol, and the tree-based PRF protocol developed in [14].
Obviously, the calculation on the reader side takes O(N)·CHB+ for exhaustive search
(where CHB+ is the number of calculations for the HB+ authentication protocol), while
for the tree-based protocols, this is reduced to logarithmic in N . We also list in that
table the storage requirements, the communication, and the corresponding FRR and
FAR. (We note that in the exhaustive search case, if the FAR is too high then the FRR
6 We note that just like for HB#, it is likely that here too we can reduce the communication
to r(d+ 2) + kx + ky by using Toeplitz matrices for the challenges A,B.
is not meaningful as the probability that a valid tag will be identified and accepted as a
different tag is very high.)
For this table we used the values of β = 1000 for the branching factor of the tree and
d = 2 for its depth (for a total population of N = 106 tags). For HB+ we used r = 80
for the response length, ε = 1
4
for the error rate and τ = εr = 20 for the acceptance
threshold, and for the size of the keys we used the “low security” values pf kx = 80 and
ky = 256 (corresponding to the requirement of 255 memory to break LPN). For the PRF
we used key size and output size of 128 bits (e.g., for AES-128).
Table 2. Protocol comparison for a population of N = 106 tags.
Method Reader Computation Communication Tag Memory FAR FRR
ES HB+ 106 · CHB+ 26960 336 0.98 0.44
Tree HB+ 2000 · CHB+ 27120 848 4 · 10
−6 0.6
Tree PRF 2000 · CPRF 1024 256 0 0
5.6 Choosing the Parameters
With the analysis from above, we now illustrate how to set the parameters of our scheme
for a given tag population and security goals. The results of this sections are summarized
in Table 3. Specifically, suppose that we want to setup the scheme to achieve the following
parameters:
– Tag population of upto N = 106 tags,
– False-reject rate of 10−4 and False-accept rate of 10−8,
– Security against attacks that work in space of upto 265 bytes.
For these settings, we investigate the parameters that we get by working with noise rates
of ε = 0.125 or ε = 0.25, using tree of depth either d = 2 or d = 3 (and thus β = 1000
or β = 100, respectively).
The key-length kx, ky. Extrapolating from the parameters in [12, Sec 5.2], for this
level of security we need ky ≈ 440 for noise level ε = 0.125 and ky ≈ 330 for noise level
ε = 0.25 (and in either case we can get by with kx = 80).
The response-length r and threshold τ . As mentioned above, we can always get
good false-reject rates by repeating the protocol a few times, as long as we start from a
protocol that has low enough false-accept rates. Stipulating that repeating the protocol
upto four times is reasonable, we thus begin by concentrating on the authentication
phase, setting our target for a single run at (say) FAR≈ 10−9 and FRR≈ 0.05.
To get these parameters for the case ε = 0.25 we can use response-length r = 212
and threshold τ = 63(= 212/4 + 10), which yield FAR= 1.62E − 9 and FRR= 0.038.
Similarly, for the ε = 0125 case we can use r = 86 and τ = 16(= 86/8 + 5.25), which
yield FAR= 1.6E − 9 and FRR= 0.036.
To optimize performance, it is beneficial to set a different response-length for the
tree-traversal phase, so as to get d ·Pr[false branch] ≈ FRR(auth). Below we denote the
response-length for the tree-traversal by rtr. For ε = 0.25, β = 1000 we need rtr = 102
(yielding Pr[false branch] = 0.025), for ε = 0.25, β = 100 we need rtr = 83 (Pr[false branch] =
0.0167), for ε = 0.125, β = 1000 we need rtr = 40 (Pr[false branch] = 0.0215), and for
ε = 0.25, β = 100 we need rtr = 32 (Pr[false branch] = 0.0146).
The resulting parameters. The choices above result in four sets of parameters, de-
pending on the values of the noise rate ε ∈ {0.125, 0.25} and the depth of the tree
d ∈ {2, 3} (corresponding to branching factors β ∈ {1000, 100}, respectively). In either
case, running the protocol once induces total communication r(kx + ky) + rtrd, com-
putation of dkyrtr + (kx + ky)r bit operations on the tag and βdkyrtr + (kx + ky)r bit
operations on the reader, and storage requirements of kx + (d+ 1)ky for the tags. Run-
ning the protocol once with these parameters result in a false-accept rate of roughly 0.1,
which is too high for applications, so we repeat it upto four times. As we explained in
Section 5.4, this only increases the expected complexity of the protocol by roughly 10%.
The result (when running the protocol upto four times) are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Concrete parameters for population of N = 106 tags, running the protocol upto four
times to reduce the false-accept rates.
ε d β kx ky r rtr Crdr Ctag comm mem FRR FAR
0.25 2 1000 80 330 212 102 7.49E + 7 1.71E + 5 96804 740 6.0E − 5 6.5E − 9
0.25 3 100 80 330 212 83 9.23E + 6 1.88E + 5 96854 1400 6.0E − 5 6.5E − 9
0.125 2 1000 80 440 86 40 3.92E + 7 8.88E + 4 49778 1400 3.9E − 5 6.4E − 9
0.125 3 100 80 400 86 32 4.74E + 6 9.66E + 4 49796 1840 4.1E − 5 6.4E − 9
Legend: ε- error-rate, d - depth, β -branching factor, kx, ky - key lengths, r - response length in
auth. stage, rtr - response length in tree stage, Crdr - expected reader computation, Ctag - expected
tag computation, comm - expected total communication, mem - tag memory requirements.
It can be seen from Table 3 that most of the relevant parameters are improved
significantly when moving to a lower-error regime (i.e., from ε = 0.25 to ε = 0.125), and
also when moving to deeper trees (i.e., from d = 2 to d = 3). The only limiting parameter
is the memory requirement at the tag, which increases for deeper trees and smaller error
rates. Therefore, for any particular application, one should use as deep a tree and as
small an error as can be realized subject to the memory available at the tags.
We again note that the communication complexity of the protocol (which is rather
large) can probably be significantly reduced by using Toeplitz matrices for the challenges
A,B.7 (In the examples above, this optimization will reduce the communication com-
plexity from the current range of 50000-100000 bits to only about 1000 bits.) Another
“big win” will be to be able derive the keys y pseudo-randomly manner from shorter
secrets (e.g., using a cheap PRG such as the shrinking generator [5]).
7 Another alternative is to replace Ax+By with a · x+ b · y over a finite field.
6 Simulation
To estimate the computational overhead incurred at the reader-side when using differ-
ent methods, we performed a simulation. Our simulation was done using Matlab. The
computer used for the simulation is an IBM thinkpad, with Intel CPU, T2400, 1.83 GHz
and 1.99 GB RAM.
The test was run for a million tags. We tested two cases for our Tree-HB+ protocol:
A two-level tree with 1000 nodes in each level, and a three-level tree with 100 nodes
at each level, all with the parameters that were proposed in the original HB+ protocol
(i.e., error-rate of ε = 0.25, using kx = ky = 224). Our results show that for r = 96,
the exhaustive search average run-time using HB+ was 110 seconds. For the tree-based
search (2 levels), we get an average run time of 0.1307 seconds, and for 3 levels we get run
time of 0.019. This ratio is compatible with our theoretical estimates, as the exhaustive
search will take O(N) (e.g., ≈ 106) while the tree based search only takes O(d logN)
(e.g., ≈ 2 ·103 or ≈ 3 ·102, respectively). The AES tree-based search was performed with
a 16-byte random key, and is using the Java Crypto libraries to perform the actual AES
calculations. The run time for the tree-based search using AES was around 7 seconds,
which confirms the fact that AES requires significantly more calculations than standard
HB+ protocol. We can further estimate that since the Meet-in-the-Middle PRF scheme
takes about 2√
β
= 0.063 of the tree-based PRF scheme, it would take about 0.44 seconds
to run it on our computer. Therefore, our simulation shows that our privacy-preserving
method is faster then the Tree-based PRF and the Meet-in-the Middle strategy. For
d = 3, our method is faster by a factor of ≈ 53 relative to the Tree-based PRF and ≈ 3
comparing to the MITM method (for d = 2, we get the factors of roughly 370 and 23,
respectively).
Table 4. Simulation Results, r = 96
Method Comp. Time (seconds) FAR FRR
mean±stdev expected/observed expected/observed
ES (HB+) 110.180 ± 0.9656 0.76 / 0.75 0.365 / 0.450
Tree HB+ (d = 2) 0.131 ± 0.0234 1.4E−6 / 0 0.432 / 0.422
Tree HB+ (d = 3) 0.019 ± 6.75E−4 1.4E−6 / 2.14E−6 0.382 / 0.382
Tree PRF(AES) 7.046 ± 0.0561 — —
The results of our simulation are shown in Table 5. The mean and standard deviation
of the run-time are provided, together with the FAR and FRR for each case. For the
privacy-preserving Tree HB+ protocol, the FAR results were not accurate due to the
fact that the expected FAR is only 1.4 · 10−6 and therefore a very large number of runs
are needed to get accurate results.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we developed tree-based HB-type protocols for privacy-preserving authen-
tication. This is useful for two reasons. First, very low-cost tags may be incapable of
computing standard PRFs and HB-type protocols are currently the only viable solu-
tion for such tags. Second, since the underlying computations in HB protocols are very
efficient, it automatically reduces reader load compared to PRF-based protocols.
We proposed some significant improvements over the naive use of HB+ in a tree-
based scheme. These improvements reduce the computation and communication by a
factor of 2× to 4×. In fact our tree protocol is almost as efficient as the underlying HB+.
The error rates in our protocols are nearly as low as that underlying HB+ protocol. This
makes our scheme suitable for a system with large number of tags (Unlike exhaustive
search, which would produce unacceptable security for practical systems). We presented
analytical and simulation results comparing our method with prior proposals in terms
of computation, communication and memory overheads.
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